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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In an underlying criminal case, Victor Klingensmith pied guilty to a sex offense. 
He wound up receiving a lengthy prison sentence. 
In 2009, Mr. Klingensmith initiated the present case by filing a petition for post-
conviction relief asserting six distinct claims for relief. Pursuant to the State's motion 
though, Mr. Klingonsmith's petition was dismissed in toto. 
On appeal, Mr. Klingensmith contends that the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. With regard to one of his claims (his 
claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to 
advise him regarding his Fifth Amendment right not to participate in a psychosexual 
evaluation), 1 he contends that the district court erred in concluding that he failed to state 
a claim upon which post-conviction relief could be granted and in weighing the evidence 
to reach adverse factual findings at the summary disposition stage. With regard to the 
remaining five claims, he contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
those claims on grounds for which he had been given no prior notice. Mr. Klingensmith 
1 In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Klingensmith described this claim as an "Estrada-type" 
claim, based on its similarity to the claim at issue in Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 
(2006). In Estrada, the petitioner pied guilty, was advised by the district court that his 
guilty plea waived his Fifth Amendment rights, and was ordered to participate in a 
psychosexual evaluation. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 560. He eventually filed a petition for 
post-conviction relief contending that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel in that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to advise him that, 
even after his guilty plea, he retained his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and, therefore, was not required to participate in the psychosexual 
evaluation. Id. Ultimately, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the petitioner did, in fact, 
receive ineffective assistance of counsel for his counsel's failure to properly advise him. 
Id. at 561-65. 
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requests that this Court vacate the district court's summary dismissal order and remand 
his case for further proceedings. 
The State has offered a number of arguments in support of the district court's 
summary dismissal order. With regard to the claim concerning the psychosexual 
evaluation, the State asserts that Mr. Klingensmith has attempted to alter his claim on 
appeal, and that the claim actually raised below was correctly dismissed because it is 
disproved by the record of the criminal case. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-5, 5-8, 9.) 
Alternatively, the State asserts that even if Mr. Klingonsmith's claim is as characterized 
on appeal, dismissal was still proper because "there is ... no evidence in the record to 
support his claim" and "[t]he record in the underlying criminal case affirmatively 
disproves [his] claim." (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.) With regard to the remaining 
claims, the State contends that Mr. Klingensmith was, in fact, given notice of the 
reasons for dismissal and, even if he was not, the district court's dismissal of those 
claims should be affirmed anyway. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-12.) 
The present Reply Brief is necessary to explain why each and every one of the 
State's arguments is meritless. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The factual and procedural histories of this case were set forth in 
Mr. Klingonsmith's Appellant's Brief and, therefore, are not repeated herein. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Klingonsmith's Estrada-type 
claim? 
2. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Klingonsmith's remaining 




The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Klingonsmith's Estrada-Type 
Claim 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Klingensmith asserted below that his guilty plea was not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily entered because his counsel never explained his Fifth 
Amendment rights with regard to any court-ordered psychosexual evaluation prior to 
Mr. Klingonsmith's entry into a plea agreement whereby he waived his Fifth Amendment 
rights and agreed to submit to a psychosexual evaluation. The district court summarily 
dismissed this claim, however, based on the finding that Mr. Klingonsmith's plea was, in 
fact, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered, and/or its conclusion that 
Mr. Klingensmith failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
On appeal, Mr. Klingensmith contends that the district court's summary dismissal 
decision was in error. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.8-15.) First, he asserts that in alleging 
that ineffective assistance of counsel caused his plea to be unknowing, unintelligent, 
and/or involuntary, Mr. Klingensmith did state a claim upon which post-conviction relief 
could be granted. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14.) Second, he argues that the district 
court erred insofar as it dismissed this claim based on its belief that Mr. Klingensmith 
failed to prove his claim at the summary dismissal stage because evidence is not to be 
weighed at the summary dismissal stage of the proceeding. (See Appellant's Brief, 
pp.14-15.) 
In response, the State makes no attempt to refute the arguments actually 
presented. Instead, the State asserts that Mr. Klingensmith has attempted to alter his 
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claim on appeal, and that the claim actually presented below was correctly dismissed 
because it is disproved by the record of the criminal case. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-5, 
5-8, 9.) Alternatively, the State asserts that even if Mr. Klingonsmith's claim is as 
characterized on appeal, dismissal was still proper because "there is ... no evidence in 
the record to support his claim" and "[t]he record in the underlying criminal case 
affirmatively disproves [his] claim." (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.) 
For the reasons set forth in detail below, the State's arguments are without merit. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
The legal standards applicable to this claim were previously set forth in 
Mr. Klingonsmith's Appellant's Brief and, therefore, are not repeated herein. 
C. The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Klingonsmith's 
Estrada-Type Claim 
As Mr. Klingensmith pointed out in his Appellant's Brief (pp.11-12), his pro se 
petition for post-conviction relief presented what could have reasonably been 
interpreted to be a pure Estrada claim (in that he asserted that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel insofar as his counsel failed to advise him that he had a Fifth 
Amendment right not to participate in the court-ordered psychosexual evaluation),2 but 
his counsel later clarified his claim as being a variant of the Estrada situation, explaining 
that Mr. Klingonsmith's claim was that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of 
his Fifth Amendment rights concerning the psychosexual evaluation prior to his entry 
into a plea agreement purporting to waive those rights. 3 The district court then went on 
2 See note 1, supra (explaining the holding of Estrada). 
3 At no point below did the State ever voice any objection to Mr. Klingonsmith's 
counsel's clarification of his client's claim. (See generally Tr.) In fact, it appears that 
the State ran with counsel's clarification of Mr. Klingonsmith's claim, arguing, as it had in 
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to summarily dismiss this claim based on its conclusion that Mr. Klingonsmith failed to 
prove that his guilty plea had not been entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 
(Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.15, L.21.) In addition, the district court's summary dismissal order 
(which was drafted after the fact by the prosecutor) asserted that Mr. Klingonsmith's 
petition failed to state a claim upon which post-conviction relief could be granted. 
(R., p.61.) 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Klingonsmith argued that the district court's decision 
in this regard was error for two reasons: first, Mr. Klingonsmith did present a claim upon 
which relief could be granted because it is well-established that a post-conviction 
petitioner can allege that the guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
entered; second, the question of whether Mr. Klingonsmith proved that his plea was not 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered was not before the district court at the 
summary dismissal stage of the case (as that is a question of material fact that was 
required to have been decided at the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing). (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.13-14.) 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State addresses neither of the two arguments 
actually presented. Instead, it asserts that Mr. Klingonsmith has mischaracterized his 
own claim on appeal. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-5, 5-8, 9.) Alternatively, it asserts that 
even if Mr. Klingonsmith's claim is as characterized on appeal, dismissal was 
its briefing, that Mr. Klingonsmith's claim was disproved by the record. (See Tr., p.13, 
Ls.12-23.) Thus, it ought not to be surprising that the district court adopted 
Mr. Klingonsmith's counsel's characterization of Mr. Klingonsmith's claim and crafted its 
ruling accordingly. (See, e.g., Tr., p.14, Ls.18-20 ("There's nothing to say that-nothing 
that convinces the Court this was not a knowing and intelligent plea and that he entered 
into it with his eyes open.").) 
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nonetheless proper because "there is ... no evidence in the record to support his claim" 
and "[t]he record in the underlying criminal case affirmatively disproves [his} claim." 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.) These argument, however, are little more than a 
distraction. 
The State's primary contention is that Mr. Klingensmith has presented a claim on 
appeal that is different from that which was presented below. Although this contention 
is repeated throughout the State's brief (see Respondent's Brief, pp.4-5, 6, 7-8), it is 
aptly summarized in the following passage from the State's brief: 
Klingonsmith's argument below was merely that the waiver entered as part 
of the plea agreement did not disprove his claim of ineffective assistance 
at sentencing as alleged in the petition, not, as asserted on appeal, that 
the plea itself was rendered involuntary or that counsel was ineffective in 
relation to the guilty plea. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.7.) 
The State's contention is patently false. As was pointed out in Mr. Klingonsmith's 
Appellant's Brief (and above), although Mr. Klingonsmith's original pro se petition 
presented his claim in such a manner that it certainly could have been construed as 
presenting a pure Estrada claim, i.e., a claim that counsel was ineffective at the 
sentencing stage of the case for failing to advise his client that he could refuse, on Fifth 
Amendment grounds, to participate in the court-ordered psychosexual evaluation, 
Mr. Klingonsmith's counsel undoubtedly clarified his client's claim as being a variant of 
the pure Estrada claim, explaining that the claim was that counsel was ineffective at the 
change of plea stage of the case for failing to advise Mr. Klingensmith as to his Fifth 
Amendment rights prior to Mr. Klingonsmith's entry into a plea agreement purportedly 
waiving those rights. Specifically, counsel explained as follows: 
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MR. JOHNSTON: . . . . We have an individual here-and, Your 
Honor, we've got take my client's affidavit as true, to the point it doesn't go 
against something that's in the record. And he says that he did not 
understand; it was not explained to him what the psychosexual evaluation 
would do and how that impacted his rights against self-incrimination. And 
he wasn't-that was not explained to him until after the change of plea 
hearing, when the Court ordered it. And he had major concerns about 
participating in the psychosexual evaluation, but says he was told by his 
attorneys that he had to. 
At that point, Your Honor, if he [Mr. Klingonsmith] was not 
explained his rights before he gave them up pursuant to the plea 
agreement, I think we have ineffective assistance of counsel . . .. 
MR. JOHNSTON: . . . . I think the question now is, under the 
language of Estrada and understanding how important those rights are, if 
they are not explained to the client before he does his change of plea, 
despite him having signed the change of plea, does that still warrant 
ineffective assistance of counsel? 
And, Your Honor, if he did not understand it, and it was not 
explained to him beforehand because-I don't know. For whatever 
reason. He didn't have time with his attorney; it wasn't explained to him, 
for whatever reason, then we do have-then I believe we do have 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
MR. JOHNSTON: . . . . And this definitely goes beyond Estrada, I 
agree, because in Estrada there wasn't a plea agreement. The 
psychosexual evaluation was ordered by the Court and wasn 't part of the 
plea agreement. And so I understand. I am asking this Court to extend , 
based on my representation that the Court needs to take my client's 
affidavit as true since we are in a summary dismissal process, and say, 
well , he was not advised about what he was signing , whether or not that 
impacted his rights against self-incrimination and what exactly the 
psychosexual evaluation would do. It wasn't until afterwards that he 
realized what was going on, and he didn't want to participate because he 
was concerned about what might come out. 
So I recognize I am asking this Court to extend Estrada a little bit 
because of the different factual circumstances, but in the end, the lack of 
advice of my counsel [sic]-or of my client that he asserts in his affidavit, I 
believe, would be sufficient to avoid summary dismissal. 
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THE COURT: Well, I just-I'm still struggling with the fact that if he 
expressly waives his Fifth Amendment right as to the psychosexual 
evaluation in the plea agreement, how can he claim that he didn't know 
that the Fifth Amendment related to the psychosexual evaluation. It's 
beyond me. 
MR. JOHNSTON: And I think that's a fair question, Your Honor, 
and I think that it's something that happens often with a client who signs 
something that he doesn't understand. 
THE COURT: Well, but that's-so what you're saying is that a 
criminal defendant can always come in and say, I just didn't get it. At what 
point do we have to cut that off? 
MR. JOHNSTON: I think that's a very fair question, Your Honor. 
And like I said before, I see this as an extension of Estrada with those 
different facts. 
(Tr., p.7, L.22 - p.13, L.10.) As noted above (see note 3, supra), when 
Mr. Klingonsmith's counsel clarified his client's claim, the State did not object; rather, it 
went with counsel's clarification, simply arguing (as it had in its briefing) that 
Mr. Klingonsmith's claim was disproved by the record. (See Tr., p.13, Ls.12-23.) Thus, 
it ought not to be surprising that the district court adopted Mr. Klingonsmith's counsel's 
characterization of Mr. Klingonsmith's claim and crafted its ruling accordingly. (See, 
e.g., Tr., p.14, Ls.18-20 ("There's nothing to say that-nothing that convinces the Court 
this was not a knowing and intelligent plea and that he entered into it with his eyes 
open.").) In light of the foregoing, it should be apparent that the State's argument is 
beyond frivolous.4 
4 Insofar as the State wants to argue that Klingonsmith's claim was altered or amended 
in some way, its argument is untimely, as it should have been made below when post-
conviction counsel clarified the claim presented. If the State believed this clarification 
was truly an (improper) alteration or amendment of the claim presented in 
Mr. Klingonsmith's original pro se petition (see Respondent's Brief, p.7 (complaining 
that no formal motion to amend the petition was ever filed)), it should have lodged its 
objection before the district court ruled on the claim as clarified by post-conviction 
counsel. 
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The State's alternative contention is that, even if Mr. Klingonsmith's post-
conviction claim was as it is characterized on appeal, dismissal was nonetheless proper 
because "there is ... no evidence in the record to support his claim" and "[t]he record in 
the underlying criminal case affirmatively disproves [his] claim." (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.8-9.) Again, the State's arguments are lacking in merit 
First, the contention that Mr. Klingonsmith's claim was correctly dismissed 
because "there is ... no evidence in the record to support [Mr. Klingonsmith's] claim 
that he did not understand the waiver contained in his plea agreement" (Respondent's 
Brief) is unsupportable. Not only was a purported lack of evidence not the basis on 
which the district court summarily dismissed this claim (see Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.15, L.21 
(district court dismissing Mr. Klingonsmith's claim based on its belief that 
Mr. Klingonsmith failed to prove that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily entered); R., p.61 (dismissal order, asserting that the petition was dismissed 
for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted)), but, more importantly, 
there was ample evidence in the record to support Mr. Klingonsmith's claim. Between 
his original verified petition, his original supporting affidavit, and his supplemental 
affidavit, Mr. Klingonsmith provided sworn statements, i.e., evidence, attesting to the 
fact that his defense attorney failed to inform him of his Fifth Amendment-based right to 
refuse to participate in the court-ordered psychosexual evaluation and, after the 
evaluation was ordered, he was told by his defense counsel that he had no choice but 
to participate. (R., pp.2, 3, 55.) Although Mr. Klingonsmith did not specify in his petition 
or affidavits which stage of the proceeding he contends his counsel should have 
discussed his Fifth Amendment rights, these allegations could be interpreted to relate to 
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the change of plea stage just as easily as the sentencing stage. (See R., pp.2, 3, 54-
55.) Thus, there is evidence to support Mr. Klingonsmith's claim. Indeed, the fact that 
the State chooses not to believe Mr. Klingonsmith's sworn statements, or has 
highlighted other evidence which it says disproves Mr. Klingonsmith's sworn 
statements, does not mean that Mr. Klingensmith presented no evidence in support of 
his claim. 
Second, there is nothing in the record which disproves Mr. Klingonsmith's claim 
that his counsel was ineffective for failing to explain his Fifth Amendment rights 
(concerning the psychosexual evaluation) to him before he accepted the plea 
agreement purporting to waive those rights. The plea agreement itself merely states, at 
one point, that "[t]he Defendant hereby waives any right against self-incrimination and 
agrees to successfully complete a psychosexual evaluation" (Plea Agreement, p.2 
(May 6, 2008)), 5 and at a later point contains a densely-worded "acknowledgment and 
consent" page which includes the following: 
1. I have read the above settlement agreement as written above [sic]. 
2. I agree to be bound by the terms of this settlement agreement. 
3. I have had sufficient time to discuss the agreement and 
consequences of entering into the same with my attorney . . . . I 
believe that I am signing this agreement with full knowledge of the 
facts, my legal rights, and the consequences of such a plea. I also 
believe that my decision to enter into this agreement is intelligently 
made. 
5 The plea agreement is attached to Mr. Klingonsmith's July 12, 2011 Motion to 
Augment Record, which was granted by the Idaho Supreme Court on July 18, 2011. 
Although the State complains that the copy of the plea agreement attached to 
Mr. Klingonsmith's July 12, 2011 Motion to Augment Record is incomplete in that it 
contains only the first two of the three pages of that document (Respondent's Brief, p.8 
n.1 ), the State's complaint appears to be misplaced. Undersigned counsel has 
conferred with the Clerk of the Court and confirmed that the entire plea agreement was, 
in fact, attached to his July 12, 2011 Motion to Augment Record. 
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5. I understand my rights as given to me by the Constitution of the 
United States and the Constitution of the State of Idaho and that by 
pleading guilty I will be giving up some of those rights, including ... 
the right against self-incrimination .... 
5. [Sic] I understand that even though I may be ordered to complete a 
psychosexual evaluation I still have the right under the 5th 
Amendment of the Idaho and United States Constitutions [sic] to 
not incriminate myself. 
8. I am satisfied with the services and advice of my attorney, Neal 
Randall. 
9. I sign this agreement willingly, without force or duress, and of my 
own free will and choice. 
(Plea Agreement, p.3 (May 6, 2008).) Taken as a whole, this document certainly 
provided the State with evidence with which to present an argument (at an evid~ntiary 
hearing) that, contrary to Mr. Klingonsmith's claims, he did act knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily in entering his guilty plea. However, in and of itself, it by no means 
"disproves" his claim that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
entered. 
The State also relies on the transcript of Mr. Klingonsmith's change of plea 
hearing in support of its contention that the record disproves his contention that his 
guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered (see Respondent's 
Brief, pp.8-9 & n.2); however, that transcript is not part of the record on appeal (because 
it apparently was not before the district court when it summarily dismissed 
Mr. Klingonsmith's petition in this case (see Tr., p.5, L.16 - p.7, L.14)) and, thus, cannot 
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now be considered on appeal. 6 Goodman Oil Co. v. Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 
147 Idaho 56, 59, 205 P.3d 1192, 1195 (2009). However, even if the contents of the 
change of plea hearing transcript were properly considered in this appeal, it appears 
that that they would be largely cumulative to the written plea agreement. ( See 
Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9 (discussing portions of the change of plea hearing 
transcript).) As such, they would provide additional evidence in support of the State's 
argument (at an evidentiary hearing) that Mr. Klingonsmith's guilty plea was, in fact, 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered; they certainly would not disprove 
Mr. Klingonsmith's claim that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 
In light of all of the above, Mr. Klingonsmith submits that the State's arguments 
are meritless and ought to be disregarded, and that this Court should find error in the 
district court's dismissal decision for the reasons stated in his Appellant's Brief. 
11. 
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Klingonsmith's Remaining Post-
Conviction Claims 
A. Introduction 
In addition to his Estrada-type claim, Mr. Klingonsmith presented five other 
claims in his verified petition for post-conviction relief: 
1. He received ineffective assistance of counsel insofar as his counsel failed 
to present evidence of his stroke and other medical issues, and the effects 
of those issues on his memory (R., pp.2, 3; see also R., p.6 (affidavit 
explaining that memory loss may have caused him to perform poorly on 
6 Filed contemporaneously herewith is a motion to strike the portion of the Respondent's 
Brief which discusses the contents of the change of plea hearing transcript. 
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the polygraph examination administered as part of the psychosexual 
evaluation)); 
2. He received ineffective assistance of counsel insofar as his counsel failed 
to review and/or challenge the contents of the psycl7osexual evaluation 
report (R., pp.2, 3); 
3. He received ineffective assistance of counsel insofar as his counsel 
"[fJailed to file a proper appeal and Rule 35 [motion] as requested" 
(R., pp.2, 3); 
4. He was denied due process of law (R., p.2); and 
5. His sentence was excessive (R, p.3). 
All of these claims wound up being summarily dismissed on the basis that they 
failed to state a claim upon which post-conviction relief could be granted. (R., p.61.) 
However, because "failure to state a claim" was not the basis identified in the State's 
motion for summary dismissal (see R., pp.27-28 (asserting that summary dismissal was 
appropriate because none of Mr. Klingonsmith's claims were supported by evidence)), 
Mr. Klingonsmith contends that he never received prior notice of the basis for dismissal 
and, thus, summary dismissal was improper under the UPCPA. (See Appellant's Brief, 
pp.15-17.) 
In response, the State contends that Mr. Klingonsmith was, in fact, given notice 
of the reasons for dismissal and, even if he was not, the district court's dismissal of 
those claims should be affirmed anyway. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-12.) 
For the reasons set forth fully below, the State's arguments in this regard are 
without merit. 
14 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
The legal standards applicable to this claim were previously set forth in 
Mr. Klingonsmith's Appellant's Brief and, therefore, are not repeated herein. 
C. The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Klingonsmith's Remaining 
Post-Conviction Claims 
None of the five claims discussed above were discussed at the October 13, 2010 
hearing on the State's motion for summary dismissal. (See generally Tr.) Thus, the 
only basis ever given for summarily dismissing these five claims was that which appears 
in the October 25, 201 0 summary dismissal order. (See R., p.61.) That order states as 
follows: 
The Court, having received a Motion for Summary Dismissal from 
the Respondent, and having heard argument on the motion, finds good 
cause to grant the motion and hereby dismisses Petitioner's Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief for failure to state a claim upon which the Court 
may grant relief. 
(R., p.61 (emphasis added).) 
Because the "failure to state a claim upon which the Court may grant relief" was 
not a basis for dismissal for which Mr. Klingensmith had ever received prior notice (see 
R., pp.27-28 (States' motion for summary dismissal, arguing that dismissal was required 
because Mr. Klingonsmith's allegations were not supported by admissible evidence)), 
Mr. Klingonsmith argues on appeal that dismissal was improper, and that the five claims 
in question must be remanded to the district court. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.15-17.) 
The State, in response, offers three arguments for affirming the district court's 
summary dismissal order (see Respondent's Brief, pp.9-12), none of which has merit. 
First, the State contends that Mr. Klingensmith did, in fact, have notice of the 
reasons for dismissal because, even though the district court's order stated that it was 
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dismissing the petition "for failure to state a claim ," it was really dismissing for the 
reasons articulated in the State's motion for summary dismissal. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.10, 12.) The State reasons, apparently, that because the district court indicated that 
it was granting the State's motion to dismiss, it must have necessarily embraced the 
reasoning set forth in that motion . (See Respondent's Brief, pp.10, 12.) Indeed, the 
State claims that, even though the district court explicitly stated that it was dismissing 
"for failure to state a claim," it apparently did not mean it; the State argues that "[t]he 
order is not based on different grounds, as it specifically finds good cause to grant the 
State's motion." (Respondent's Brief, p.12.) 
The State's first argument is absurd . First, it confuses the relief granted with the 
basis therefor. Clearly, the district court was referring to the relief granted when it spoke 
of having found "good cause to grant the motion, and hereby dismiss[ ] Petitioner's 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief," and it was referring to the basis for dismissal when 
it explained that it was ordering dismissal "for failure to state a claim .. . . " (R., p.61 
(emphasis added).) Second, even if the district court's reference to granting the State's 
motion for summary dismissal cannot be explained as a reference to the relief granted , 
if this Court were to accept the State's position on appeal it would have to ignore the 
explicit basis for dismissal, as revealed in the plain language of the district court's order 
("failure to state a claim"), in favor of some implied basis of dismissal. Third, and finally, 
Idaho precedent makes it clear that, where other grounds for dismissal are identified by 
the district court, the act of granting a State's motion for summary dismissal does not 
effectuate an implicit adoption of the bases for dismissal set forth in the State's motion . 
See, e.g., Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 523 (2010) ("[W)here a trial court dismisses a 
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claim based upon grounds other than those offered-by the State's motion for summary 
dismissal, and accompanying memoranda-the defendant seeking post-conviction relief 
must be provided with a 20-day notice period."). 
The State's second argument is that the dismissal of Mr. Klingonsmith's five 
claims may be affirmed on the basis set forth in the State's motion for summary 
dismissal (even though that was not the basis articulated in the district court's order)-
that Mr. Klingensmith failed to support his claims with any evidence. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.10, 11.) Notably, in presenting this argument, the State offers no analysis 
whatsoever; it simply makes the conclusory claim that Mr. Klingensmith failed to offer 
"any evidence that might support any viable claim for post-conviction relief." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.11.) 
Because the State's claim is not supported by any argument whatsoever, it 
should not be considered by this Court. See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) 
("A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking .... "); 
I.A.R. 35 (b)(6). 7 However, even if the State's claim is to be considered on appeal, it 
should be rejected as unsupportable. As was mentioned in Mr. Klingonsmith's 
Appellant's Brief (p.17 n.9), Mr. Klingonsmith's claims were supported by his verified 
petition, as well as a separate sworn affidavit. Obviously, a verified petition is 
7 Although Zichko dealt with an appellant's failure to provide authority or argument, it 
actually spoke in broader terms, couching its holding in terms of "a party' who fails to 
provide authority or argument. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263 (emphasis added). And, 
indeed, this broader language makes infinite sense since the holding of Zichko was 
based on the appellant's failure to comply with I.A.R. 35, which requires not only that 
the appellant's brief "contain the contentions of the appellant ... , the reasons therefor, 
with citations to the authorities, citations and parts of the transcript and record relied 
upon," I.AR. 35(a)(6}, but also that the respondent's brief contain such things. I.AR. 
35(b)(6). 
17 
equivalent to an affidavit. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588 (Ct. App.1993) ("A verified 
pleading that sets forth evidentiary facts within the personal knowledge of the verifying 
signator is in substance an affidavit, and is accorded the same probative force as an 
affidavit."). Moreover, affidavits are admissible evidence for purposes of the UPCPA. 
See I.C. § 19-4907(a) (providing that, at a post-conviction evidentiary hearing the district 
court "may receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony or other evidence"). 
Accordingly, the State's second argument should be rejected. 
The State's third argument is more implied than expressed. The State points out 
that, following the filing of its September 29, 2009 motion for summary dismissal, the 
discussions concerning that motion (in Mr. Klingonsmith's August 23, 2010 
memorandum in opposition and his supplemental affidavit, in the State's September 22, 
2010 reply memorandum, and at the October 13, 2010 hearing) all dealt exclusively with 
Mr. Klingonsmith's Estrada-type claim. (Respondent's Brief, p.11.) Furthermore, the 
State highlights the fact that "[a]t the hearing[,] the state represented that the one 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on which Klingensmith responded appeared to 
be the only claim still at issue," and that "Klingonsmith's counsel did not contest this 
representation .... " (Respondent's Brief, p.11.) Thus, the State seems to imply that 
Mr. Klingensmith somehow waived his five remaining claims or acquiesced in their 
dismissal. ( See Respondent's Brief, p.11 .) 
There is no merit to the State's implication though. First, since it is supported by 
neither argument nor authority; therefore, it may not be considered by this Court. See 
Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263; I.AR. 35 (b)(6). Second, there is simply no basis to say that, 
because post-conviction counsel did not provide supplemental evidence or arguments 
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concerning the bulk of his client's claims, he waived those claims or acquiesced in their 
dismissal. Nor is there any basis to say that, by failing clarify that all claims are still at 
issue (in the face of a prosecutorial misstatement of the claims at issue), post-conviction 
counsel will be deemed to have waived the bulk of his client's claims.8 Compare 
Franck-Tee/ v. State, 143 Idaho 664, 670 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding that where post-
conviction counsel affirmatively represented to the district court that the petitioner only 
wished to proceed on certain claims, the district court was free to rely on counsel's 
representations and address only the claims represented to be still at issue). The fact is 
that neither Mr. Klingonsmith nor his counsel ever affirmatively waived, withdrew, or 
acquiesced in the dismissal of any of the claims set forth in Mr. Klingonsmith's original 
petition. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, as well as ,n his Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Klingonsmith respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's 
summary dismissal order and remand Mr. Klingonsmith's post-conviction case to the 
district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 20th day of September, 2011. 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
8 It appears that Mr. Klingonsmith was not present at that October 13, 2010 hearing on 
the State's motion for summary dismissal. (See generally R., p.60; Tr.) 
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